# Security Review Kickoff — 2025-12-08

## Context
- Started structured security review spanning marketing/public API, Guest PWA, Event Admin, payments/webhooks, and media pipeline/storage.
- Needed a tracking checklist plus logging conventions for findings and follow-ups.

## Actions
- Added review plan with scope, workstreams, and checklists: `docs/process/todo/security-review-dec-2025.md`.
- Defined evidence logging: future session notes in `docs/process/changes/`, remediation tasks as Issues (label `TODO`) or `docs/process/todo/` entries linked to `SEC-*` tickets where applicable.
- Mapped roles/trust boundaries and inventoried marketing/public API route surfaces (locale-prefixed marketing group with throttled contact forms and signed gift voucher print; guest PWA view routes; Event Admin SPA catch-all; checkout/paddle webhook exposure; API v1 marketing + public event endpoints with throttles; tenant API protected by `auth:sanctum`, `tenant.collaborator`, `tenant.isolation`, `throttle:tenant-api`, plus `tenant.admin` on sensitive routes).
- Captured environment/header defaults: `.env.example` ships with `APP_DEBUG=true` (must be false in prod) and HTTP APP_URL; session defaults `same_site=lax`, `SESSION_ENCRYPT=false`, secure cookie flag unset; CORS uses Laravel defaults (all origins/methods, credentials=false) on `api/*`; CSP middleware added to web group sets nonce-based script-src but leaves style-src with `'unsafe-inline'` and broad https/data allowances; skips CSP when debug/local.
- Added data class/retention sketch: media storage (variants via signed URLs; tenant-governed retention), join tokens/access logs and planned hashing, auth/session tokens (Sanctum/PATs, OAuth), PII (contact form, member lists, billing contact), billing identifiers (Paddle/Stripe/PayPal), logs/analytics (Matomo consent plan, request timing middleware).
- Captured seeded test identities: Super admin (`ADMIN_EMAIL`/`ADMIN_PASSWORD`, defaults `admin@example.com` / `ChangeMe123!`), tenant admin demo (`tenant-demo@fotospiel.app` / `Demo1234!`), guest join token from demo event (`W2E3sbt7yclzpkAwNSARHYTVN1sPLBad8hfUjLVHmjkUviPd`), with seed commands (`migrate --seed` or targeted seeders).
- Noted env assumptions for dynamic testing: set HTTPS `APP_URL`, secure/samesite cookies, adjust `SANCTUM_STATEFUL_DOMAINS` for SPA/PWA origins, ensure storage disks and `storage:link` ready, supply webhook secrets/URLs, and run queues for media/security jobs.
- Mapped role→data/retention and drafted dynamic testing harness scope (marketing/API abuse checks, guest PWA upload/share/cache tests, event admin CRUD/IDOR checks, webhook replay for freshness/idempotency, media pipeline AV/EXIF tests).
- Converted the testing outline into actionable checklists per surface (marketing/API, guest PWA, event admin, webhooks/billing, media pipeline, cross-cutting headers/CSRF/rate limits).
- Added guest upload gating plan (scan-before-publish, auto-approve when clean; optional manual moderation flag; signed URLs/private storage, API changes).

## Next Steps
- [ ] Start executing checklists (begin with marketing/API headers/CSP/CORS + guest PWA upload/share flows) and log findings with PoCs and severities.

## Findings — Marketing/API headers & Guest PWA upload/share (2025-12-08)

**Marketing/API headers & CORS**
- Missing security headers: no HSTS, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy, or frame-ancestors/X-Frame-Options on responses; CSP middleware only for web group and skipped in debug/local (prod only). → Recommend adding a response headers middleware to set HSTS (HTTPS-only), Referrer-Policy (`strict-origin-when-cross-origin`), Permissions-Policy (disable camera/mic/geolocation unless required), and frame-ancestors (`'none'` or app domain).
- CSP style-src still uses `'unsafe-inline'` with broad `https:`/`data:` allowances; plan in `SEC-FE-01` covers nonce/hash rollout. Needs prioritization to remove inline allowance and tighten connect/img/font lists.
- CORS was default-open; added env-driven allowlist in `config/cors.php` (origin list from `CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`, app URL origin, dev hosts) and `.env.example` defaults. Prod should set exact domains; credentials stay off unless explicitly enabled.

**Guest PWA upload/share**
- Upload validation allows `image` types including SVG; files are stored and URLs returned via `Storage::url` without sanitisation. SVGs can carry script and would be served from first-party origin, enabling stored XSS via shared links/gallery. → Recommend rejecting SVG (or sanitising server-side) for guest uploads.
- No antivirus/EXIF scrubbing triggered in upload flow: `GuestPhotoUploaded` listener only sends notifications; `security` config not wired. → Recommend enqueueing AV/EXIF jobs on upload before marking `approved`/serving assets.
- Uploaded assets are immediately marked `status='approved'` and URLs returned (likely public if disk is public). Confirm disk visibility; if public, anyone with URL can fetch regardless of token. → Recommend using signed URLs/private visibility and deferring publication until approval/security scan succeeds.

**Mitigations implemented (2025-12-08)**
- CORS tightened: new env-driven allowlist in `config/cors.php` (`CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` etc.), defaults to localhost; prod should set exact domains to match Traefik/nginx.
- Security headers middleware added (`ResponseSecurityHeaders`) for web/api: sets Referrer-Policy `strict-origin-when-cross-origin`, X-Content-Type-Options nosniff, X-Frame-Options SAMEORIGIN, Permissions-Policy (camera/mic/geo disabled), and HSTS on secure non-local requests.
- Guest upload hardened: rejects SVG via `mimes` allowlist, sets uploads to `status=pending` (no file URLs in response), and dispatches `ProcessPhotoSecurityScan` on upload. Scan job now auto-approves on clean or skipped scans, rejects on infected. Gallery endpoints already filter `status=approved`, so pending items are hidden until scan finishes.
- Gallery/API assets moving to signed access: gallery listings and stats now use temporary signed routes for thumbnails/full URLs (token + photo id) instead of raw `Storage::url` where possible; queries filter to approved status. Fallbacks remain for legacy paths.
- CSP tightened: added style nonce, allowed https style sources for Stripe/Paddle, removed `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` in non-dev (dev keeps inline for Vite), and added `frame-ancestors 'self'`. Script nonce already in place.
- Branding assets signed: added signed branding asset route with path allowlist; branding logos use signed URLs; blog banners now emit signed URLs instead of raw `Storage::url`. Tenant photo resource now emits signed URLs for full/thumbnail variants.
- Paddle webhook throttled: added `throttle:paddle-webhook` (30/min per IP).
- Inline scripts/styles in guest/admin blades now carry nonces; inline styles consolidated into nonce’d blocks.
- Backfill thumbnails stores relative paths (no public URLs).
- Data export downloads remain auth-gated; added existence check and private/no-store headers on download.

**Remaining (low priority)**
- Signed URL TTL/scoping: can shorten TTLs (gallery/branding) and bind signatures to token/event for stricter replay protection; current defaults ~30–60 mins are acceptable but could be reduced.
- Guest asset throttles: consider throttles on gallery asset/download/share routes for abuse mitigation; not critical if monitoring is in place.
- CORS prod allowlist: env-driven config exists; set `CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` in prod/stage to match Traefik hosts when ready.
- Logging/PII: current logging avoids raw tokens/paths; keep this guard in future changes.